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IDNDSIGHT, REGRET, AND SAFE HARBORS
IN RULE 11 LITIGATION
Charles Yablon•
Regrets, I've had a few, but then again, too few to mention.
Frank Sinatra, My Way (1968) 1
Never mind
Emily Litella, (as played by Gilda Radner) Saturday Night Live
I. INTRODUCTION

A frequent theme of law review literature is the danger and
futility of trying to improve things by tinkering with legal rules. 2
Legal scholars, often but not invariably of the neo-classical economic
or public choice persuasion, delight in pointing out how rules
designed to increase the amount of X in the world have actually
created a serious X shortage, while rules designed to prevent Y from
occurring have led to a veritable orgy of Y. 3 Accordingly, we are
told that criminal liability for corporate entities will lead to greater
• Professor of Law and Director, Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on
Corporate Governance. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. I would like to thank Georgene Vairo for inviting me to participate
in this symposium, and Matt Maron, Diana Rocco, and the editors of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for able research assistance.
1. FRANK SINATRA, My Way, on MY WAY (Warner Bros. 1969). No,
Frank didn't actually write the song. The English lyric was written by (of all
people) Paul Anka. But Paul wrote it for Frank, from a 1967 French song,
Comme d'Habitude, by Claude Fran~ois, Jacques Revaux, and Gilles Thibault.
THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (Robert Andrews et al. eds., 1996),
available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/3/54203.html.
Although it is
apparently one of the ten most popular karaoke songs, the sentiment it
expresses is still pure Sinatra.
2. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Public Choice: Politics Without
Romance, POL'Y, Spring 2003, at 13 (explaining how "public choice theory
demonstrates why looking to government to fix things often leads to more
harm than good").
3. See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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criminal misconduct by corporate agents, 4 offering countries
incentives not to engage in environmentally damaging activities will
encourage greater pollution5 and providing greater protections to
defendants through changes in criminal procedure may lead to
"underfunding, overcriminalization, and oversentencing" in the
criminal justice system. 6
Accordingly, it is refreshing to report that the 1993 revisions to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Advisory
Committee believed "should reduce the number of motions for
sanctions presented to the court,"7 appear to have done precisely that.
Judges, commentators, and my own quick and dirty empirical
research all support the conclusion that Rule 11 motions have indeed
decreased significantly since 1993. What remains considerably less
clear is precisely why this has occurred. Are the numbers of
frivolous filings themselves down, or is the diminution occurring
only in the motions directed to those filings? At first glance, the
former possibility appears to be quite unlikely. There is a general
consensus that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 reduced both the
likelihood that monetary sanctions will be imposed on lawyers and
parties for making frivolous filings as well as the severity of those
sanctions. 8 It is a basic principle of economic reasoning (so basic
that even I believe it), that if you reduce the penalties (i.e. costs) of
something that people are otherwise inclined to do, they will do
relatively more of it.9 It would be strange if this principle did not
apply to frivolous filings by lawyers. Yet if this principle is

4. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
5. Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect
the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2154-56 (1995).
6. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997).

7. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
8. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy:

Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1574 (2001); Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Refe"als
Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. REV. 37, 44 (1993); Carl
Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 206-07
(1994).
9. See GARY s. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 11-14 (1971) (explaining
theory of demand elasticity).
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applicable, the 1993 amendments should have resulted in more, not
fewer, frivolous lawsuits.
This brings us to the second possibility: that frivolous filings
have not been decreased by the 1993 amendments, but simply that
lawyers are less inclined to seek sanctions against them under Rule
11. Here at least the incentives seem to run in the right direction.
The 1993 amendments clearly lowered the probability that a severe
monetary sanction would be imposed for violation of Rule 11. 10
Accordingly, the financial incentives for lawyers and clients to bring
Rule 11 motions have indeed been reduced. But my experience in
this area of litigation indicates that money is not everything.
Litigators tend to be rather competitive, aggressive individuals, who
often develop at least a strong rivalry, if not an actual dislike of their
adversaries, and whose favorite part of the litigation process tends to
be beating the other side. 11
Ordinary winning is nice, but in-your-face, complete, and utter
devastation of your opponent is even nicer (and might even justify a
premium to the client's bill). Winning a Rule 11 motion is like
running up the score in a lopsided football game. It is an
unambiguous, judicially certified expression of the fact that you have
not merely won, but that your opponents are a bunch of losers. It is
hard to imagine most litigators giving up the opportunity to gain such
a judicially-sanctioned certification of total victory simply because it
might no longer come with an additional monetary award. In this
regard it should be noted that the 1993 amendments did not appear to
substantially change the actual legal standards for determining
whether a filing violated Rule 11. 12 The primary change is in the
sanctions, which are no longer mandatory, and which must be
designed to deter rather than punish the Rule 11 violator. 13 It is hard
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
11. See Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery
Abuse, 96 C0LUM. L. REV. 1618, 1629 (1996). Of course, this is in no way
meant to impugn the character and integrity of most litigators, who tend to be
lovely people to have a drink with after they get through bashing each other in
court.
12. See Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186
F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 1999); Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 456 (2d
Cir. 1995).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also infra Part II (describing a few ways the
world has improved since 1993).
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to imagine that an aggressive litigator, not to mention her client,
aggrieved and angered by frivolous litigation directed at them by
opposing counsel, would forego a chance to sanction such activity
merely because the sanction might be mild and only designed to
deter. After all, deterrence itself is in the interest of lawyers and
clients who believe themselves to be potential targets of frivolous
litigation, and even the mere declaration by a court that the lawsuit
before it was utterly without basis in law or fact is presumably of
substantial value to the party who has been the subject of such a
lawsuit. Accordingly, the notion that by merely reducing the severity
of the sanctions available under Rule 11, the 1993 amendments
caused a substantial drop in well-founded motions directed at
frivolous filings seems, if not doubtful, at least incomplete as an
account of the impact of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11.
This brings us to a third possibility. Perhaps the diminution in
Rule 11 motions after the 1993 amendments was not primarily in
well-founded motions directed at filings that indeed were, or at least
likely were in violation of Rule 11. Perhaps most of the diminution
has been in questionable Rule 11 motions directed at weak but
potentially meritorious filings that were not the intended targets of
Rule 11. In the pre-1993 period, opponents of the then current
version of Rule 11 frequently worried about the in terrorem effect of
Rule 11 motions and about the possibility that lawyers might use the
threat of severe sanctions under Rule 11 to deter the filing of
potentially meritorious claims, particularly in, but not limited to, the
civil rights area.1 4 The argument is that before 1993, the danger of
Rule 11 sanctions was so serious and severe that opposing lawyers
could deter even potentially meritorious claims by threatening the
lawyers who brought them with Rule 11 sanctions in the event that
they lost. 15 This threat of not just losing, but of then being
sanctioned under Rule 11, with potentially severe financial
14. See Marc P. Goodman, Note, A Uniform Methodology For Assessing
Rule 11 Sanctions: A Means to Serve the End of Conserving Public and
Private Legal Resources, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1855, 1857-58 (1990); Carl
Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L. REV. 901, 906--07 (1992); Charles
M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on
Probability and Rule 11, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 65, 84-91 (1996).
15. See Goodman, supra note 14, at 1893 (discussing the concern that
meritorious civil rights claims may be "chilled"); Tobias, supra note 14, at
906--07.

Winter 2004] HINDSIGHT, REGRET, & SAFE HARBORS

603

consequences, was sufficiently great that it could cause lawyers to
drop their claims or settle for nominal amounts. It is argued that the
threat of such in te"orem effects has been substantially reduced
post-1993. 16
In a later part of this Article, I will argue that this explanation
makes a considerable amount of sense, and that a substantial aspect
of the success of the post-1993 amendments has been in reducing
lawyers' incentives to bring weak or non-meritorious Rule 11
motions. 17 Before I do that, however, let me raise the bar for myself
by pointing out the difficulty with this argument, which is the same
difficulty we noted previously with respect to potentially meritorious
Rule 11 motions - that the 1993 amendments did not appear
substantially to change the standards for determining whether a filing
violated Rule 11. Although there were some subtle changes in
wording, essentially the same conduct prohibited prior to 1993 is
prohibited by the post-1993 version of Rule 11. 18 Moreover,
although sanctions are no longer mandatory, a judge who feels that
the standards of reasonable litigation conduct have been violated still
has wide discretion to make things difficult for a lawyer who she
believes has abused the process. Accordingly, it is not immediately
clear why the in terrorem effect of a Rule 11 motion directed at a
potentially meritorious filing has diminished so much in the post1993 period. It is true that under the "safe harbor" provision of post1993 Rule 11 19 (about which we will speak much more
subsequently), there is a right to avoid sanctions by withdrawing the
potentially offending document, but that is not a particularly
attractive option with respect to potentially meritorious pleadings or
motions. If that is what is occurring, then the in te"orem and
chilling effects are still at work, although they are now flying under
the radar screen of effective judicial oversight.
Yet credible observers tell us that this is not the case; what has
largely been reduced post-1993 are the tactical motions and satellite
16. See, e.g., Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, A.B.A. J.,
March 1995, at 12.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment
(explaining that the intent of the revision was to "broaden the scope of [a
litigant's] obligation").
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(l)(A).
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litigation that were the bane of Rule 11 practice in the pre-1993 era. 20
This would make more sense if, in addition to the change in
sanctions, there has been a reduction in the likelihood that pleadings
or motions viewed as potentially meritorious by their proponents will
be found to have violated Rule 11. If courts are now less likely to
find Rule 11 violations in close cases, it reduces the in terrorem
effect of making such motions as well as the incentive for making
them.
I believe (and this Article will attempt to show) that the 1993
amendments did, in fact, significantly raise the standard for finding a
violation of Rule 11, thereby reducing the in terrorem effect as well
as the incentive to make weak or tactical motions against potentially
meritorious filings. It did this, however, not primarily by changing
the express legal standards that courts were to apply to such motions,
but by changing the time at which such motions were required to be
made. A significant, but under-appreciated, effect of the safe harbor
provisions of post-1993 Rule 11 has been to prohibit making such
motions after the merits of the underlying claims have · been
adjudicated. 21 This has deprived movants of the powerful "hindsight
effect" under which judges, having just dismissed or having decided
to dismiss a case as non-meritorious, are then asked whether the
claim lacked such a basis in law or fact that it should never have
been brought in the first place. 22 There is substantial evidence from
behavioral theory2 3 that when people are asked to judge the ex ante
probability of an event they know has occurred, they will assign a
substantially higher likelihood to its occurrence than they will in
situations where they do not know the outcome. It has also been
established that, for purposes of behavioral theory, judges are
people. 24 Accordingly, a judge is more likely to find a violation of
20. See Duncan, supra note 16; Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the
Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589,643 (1998).
21. See Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 151-53 (4th Cir.
2002) (discussing the timeliness of filing Rule 11 motions); see also Barber v.
Miller, 146 F .3d 707, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a party cannot wait
until after summary judgment-to make a Rule 11 motion).
22. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777, 800 (2001).
23. See infra notes 98-132 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Guthrie et al., supra note 22 (presenting study of 167
federal judges, which revealed that judges' judgment can be affected by
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Rule 11 (which is, after all, a finding that a case or claim had a very
low probability of success) when that judge already knows that the
claim has been dismissed on the merits. By substantially reducing
that possibility of hindsight bias, the -post-1993 amendments, in
effect, significantly raised the threshold for finding a violation of
Rule 11. I believe the subsequent diminution in questionable Rule
11 motions is, to a considerable degree, a reflection and result of that
change in timing.
Most credible observers, moreover, believe that the 1993
revisions of Rule 11 have had a substantial impact not just in
reducing Rule 11 motions and satellite litigation, but have actually
diminished, or at least prevented any rise, in the numbers of baseless
or frivolous claims being pursued in the federal courts. 25 The legal
vehicle generally cited as responsible for achieving this diminution
in frivolous claims is, once again, the safe harbor provision
introduced into Rule 11 by the 1993 amendments. 26 Pursuant to this
provision, parties alleged to have made a filing in violation of Rule
11 must be given twenty-one days to withdraw the offending filin~
before a Rule 11 motion can be filed against them in federal court.2
Withdrawal of the filing within that period protects the party from a
Rule 11 motion made by the opposing party.28 There is considerable
consensus that this provision is working as intended; that is, that a
significant number of filings that would otherwise be properly
sanctionable under Rule 11 are being voluntarily withdrawn by the
parties who filed them, without any need for adjudication or other
intervention by the court. 29
Once again, I think this description of the effect of Rule 11 's
safe harbor provision is substantially accurate, but if true, the
description requires a much clearer and more complete account of
"cognitive illusions").
25. See John Shapard et al., Federal Judicial Center, Report of a Survey
Concerning Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1995), reprinted in 1
CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS C-4 (Sol
Schreiber et al. eds., 7th ed. 1996) (hereinafter FJC 1995 Report].
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(l)(A).
27. Id.
28. Id. Withdrawal does not, under the language of the Rule, protect
against a later motion for sanctions made on the court's own initiative. Id.
1 l(c)(l)(B).
29. See Duncan, supra note 16.
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the operation of the safe harbor provision than has heretofore been
provided. The basic question is: Why would litigants who obviously
thought enough of these claims to file them in the first place be
willing to withdraw them at a later date, before there has been any
formal adjudication that they are baseless or completely lacking in
merit? Or, to put it another way, what kind of litigant (and litigant's
lawyer) is dumb enough to file frivolous claims in the first place, yet
smart enough to regret having filed them and to be willing to
withdraw them to forestall a Rule 11 motion? Moreover, is there any
kind of litigant for whom the existence of this withdrawal right
actually confers an advantage?
I believe there are such litigants, but to describe them requires a
more detailed consideration of the kinds of people who are likely to
bring frivolous litigation and their reasons for doing so. The
question of why people bring frivolous litigation is one that has been
considered frequently in the last two decades, since it is undoubtedly
at the heart of the Rule 11 debate, and because filing baseless
lawsuits would not appear, on its face, to be a very sensible thing to
do. 30 Broadly speaking, however, scholars have come up with four
basic categories of litigants who might have reasons to bring
frivolous claims. In this Article, I have chosen to describe and
categorize them as: (I) ''tricksters," who know their claims have no
merit, but who think they can hide that fact from the other side while
30. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value, in 3
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS AND TIIE LAW 551 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the "existing theories as to why (and when)
THE

plaintiffs with negative-expected-value suits can extract a positive settlement
from the defendant"); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. EcON. LITERATIJRE
1067, 1083-84 (1989) (discussing the role of cost asymmetries in nuisance
suits by applying the Nash bargaining solution); Chris Guthrie, Framing
Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 163 n.l
(2000) (discussing widespread concern with frivolous litigation); Keith N.
Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal E"or Under Negligence, 6 J. ECON. &
ORO. 433, 441 (1990) (discussing the role of legal error in promulgating
nuisance suits for negligence claims in a society where all the actors obey the
due-care standard); Eric B. Rasmusen, Nuisance Suits, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND TIIE LAw 690 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998) (explaining the use of nuisance suits and the various incentives of
litigants); see also HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEoRY EVOLVING: A PROBLEMCENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC INTERACTION 100--02
(2000) (discussing a game theocy approach to evaluating nuisance suits).
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they run up litigation costs, making it more attractive for the other
side to settle than to litigate;31 (2) "Don Quixotes," who may include
idealistic litigants who wish to maintain some ideological or
expressive position on an issue irrespective of the viability of that
position under current law,32 as well as people who are simply nuts;
(3) "slackers," those lawyers and/or litigants who simply neglect or
do not feel like making a reasonable investigation of the law and
facts prior to filing their claims33 (this is perhaps irrational, but there
are a few in every law school class); and (4) "gamblers," those who
are uncertain about the actual probability of success of their claims
but who believe, on the basis of the limited information available to
them, that the claims may have merit, and are willing to file such
"longshots."34 Although the incentives and concerns of these various
31. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility
and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STIJD. 1 (1996) (analyzing the role
that divisibility of the litigation process plays in negative-expected-value suits
and ''the conditions under which a plaintiff with a [negative-expected-value]
suit will have a credible threat and succeed in extracting a settlement"); Bruce
H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the
Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 93, 118-26 (1993) (presenting a ''model of
litigation with Rule 11 sanctions"); THOMAS J. MICELI, EcONOMICS OF THE
LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, LITIGATION 181-200 (1997)
(explaining the success of frivolous suits and suggesting some remedies for
this problem by providing a survey of various economic models of frivolous
litigation); D. Rosenberg & S. Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3, 4-9 (1985) (providing a
model of nuisance suits where plaintiff's cost of filing is less than defendant's
cost of defense and defendant knows plaintiff's claim is without merit); see
also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study ofSettlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (criticizing certain
aspects of these models).
32. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function o/Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 ( 1996); see also Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on
the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 3 (1990) (providing a
model that explains nuisance suits as a result of defendant uncertainty
regarding the merits of plaintiff's claim where plaintiff believes with some
reason that the law entitles him to recovery).
33. See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 519, 533-77 (1997) (describing a model which explains why plaintiffs
might not investigate before filing even when investigation is feasible); see
also Vairo, supra note 20 (discussing Rule 11 as a tool for curbing
unprofessional conduct, including the failure to make a reasonable pre-filing
investigation).
34. See Yablon, supra note 14; see also Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous
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groups will be analyzed in detail later in this Article, it is worth
noting for now that only the last two groups, the slackers and the
gamblers, are likely to experience regret as evidence develops during
the litigation process concerning the weakness of their claims, and
therefore be willing to voluntarily withdraw them. Furthermore, it is
only the gamblers who derive a concrete benefit from the safe harbor
provision, since it enables them to file a number of longshot claims,
and then withdraw without penalty those that, after some discovery
and further litigation, do not appear to have serious merit.
Accordingly, if a substantial number of claims are being voluntarily
withdrawn pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of current Rule 11,
it is likely that a large number of those claims were either negligently
filed by slackers or gamblers' longshot claims that did not pan out.
The safe harbor provisions of post-1993 Rule 11 have now
effectively removed these claims from judicial sanction and scrutiny.
The methodology of this Article is somewhat different from that
of the average law review article. Most law review articles begin by
analyzing some legal problem and then go on to either explain why
current law is inadequate to deal with it and/or propose some other
legal solution to the problem. This Article begins by surveying the
evidence that the 1993 amendments have been successful in
substantially reducing both frivolous litigation and abusive Rule 11
motions, and tries to analyze the nature of Rule 11 litigation in light
of that success. I conclude that considerations of hindsight and
regret have played a major role in the success of the current version
of Rule 11. It is largely by decreasing the likelihood of hindsight
bias and increasing the possibility of litigants acting on their feelings
of regret over filing baseless or frivolous claims, that the 1993
amendments, and particularly the safe harbor provision, have
improved the efficacy of Rule 11 and have diminished the threat of
coercive or improper Rule 11 motions while avoiding any increase in
frivolous filings and facilitating the withdrawal of non-meritorious
claims from the litigation system.
To be sure, some may still complain about the 1993
amendments, particularly those who feel that the appropriate role of
Rule 11 is to eliminate, as much as possible, the filing of baseless
Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 567, 568 (2000) (asserting that many securities class action claims that
are condemned as frivolous are very likely longshot claims).
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claims in federal courts. As we will see, the. 1993 amendments do, in
effect, make it less likely that judges will find claims to violate Rule
11, as well as reduce the severity of sanctions for such violations. As
I have argued elsewhere, any given stanc!ard of frivolousness will
permit the filing of some baseless claims while chilling some
potentially meritorious ones. 35 Yet the 1993 amendments reduce the
likelihood of a Rule 11 violation in a particularly subtle and salutary
way, not by a controversial change in legal standards, but by a
change in timing and therefore in the judicial perception of the merits
of the claim itself. Moreover, by permitting the relatively painless
withdrawal of claims that no longer appear to have any chance of
success, the 1993 amendments streamline the litigation process while
avoiding the worst of the chilling effect on long-shot claims that may
turn out to have merit.
This Article is divided into three parts (in addition to this rather
long introduction and a short conclusion). The first section, Part II,
takes a quick look at the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, particularly
the safe harbor provision, and a slightly longer look at the evidence
that those amendments have had a substantial and generally
beneficial impact on the conduct of litigation in the federal courts,
both by reducing Rule 11 litigation and reducing (or at least not
increasing) the number of frivolous filings. The next two sections
consider how those beneficial effects have been obtained by
providing accounts of the way Rule 11 actually operates and how it
has changed since the 1993 amendments. Part III looks primarily at
the timing changes in Rule 11 motions and the impact of those
timing changes in reducing hindsight bias in the adjudication of Rule
11 motions. Part IV looks primarily at the safe harbor provision and
the incentives various types of litigants have to make use of them.
II. A FEW WAYS THEWORLD HAS IMPROVED SINCE 1993
The safe harbor provision of Rule l l(c)(l)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is a bit of a misnomer. 36 It should probably
be called the "safe exit" or "safe escape" or even "safe surrender"
clause instead. Whereas true safe harbors enable a party to take

35. Yablon, supra note 14, at 96-99.
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(l)(A).
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some desired action without risk of incurring legal liability, 37 Rule
ll(c)(l)(A) provides a relatively safe way of avoiding Rule 11
liability, but only by taking a presumably undesired action, namely,
withdrawal or correction of the "challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, allegation, or denial."38 What the Rule seems to actually
provide is a "last clear chance" to renounce the challenged statement.
Yet the Advisory Committee's Note makes the interesting
observation that former Rule 11 might have actually prevented
people who wanted to withdraw or correct such statements from
doing so, since under old Rule 11, ''parties were sometimes reluctant
to abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as evidence
of a violation of Rule 11." 39 Accordingly, the safe harbor provision
appears designed, in substantial part, to accommodate litigants'
regret over having made baseless filings.
Implicit in this right to withdraw or correct is both ( 1) a right to
formal notice of the allegedly violative statement and (2) a right to
twenty-one days to think about the issue and in which to take
effective action. The formal notice right is safeguarded by Rule
l l(c)(l)(A)'s insistence that the party must receive a separate, formal
Rule 11 motion served pursuant to Rule 5, but not filed with the
Court, in order to commence running of the twenty-one day
withdrawal period. Although the Advisory Committee opined that
"[i]n most cases, however, counsel should be expected to give
informal notice to the other party,',40 federal courts have refused to
count such informal notice as effective in invoking the twenty-one
day withdrawal period,41 and have refused to impose sanctions where
the movant has failed to serve a separate formal motion as required
by the Rule.
In order to safeguard the right to an effective twenty-one day
withdrawal period, amended Rule 11 effectively removes the
opportunity to move for sanctions after the court has adjudicated the
case or claim. This timing limitation is explicitly noted in the
37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l) (2000) (providing safe harbor under
the securities laws for forward-looking statements by issuers).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(l)(A).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
40. Id. l l(c)(l)(A).
41. E.g., Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Advisory Committee's Note, which states: "Given the 'safe harbor'
provisions discussed below, a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11
motion until conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the
offending contention). ,,42 Cases subsequent to the 1993 amendments
have also held that the safe harbor provisions effectively prohibit
Rule 11 motions made after the end of the case.43
The other major changes effected by the 1993 amendments are
presumably familiar to any student of Rule 11 : the abolition of
mandatory sanctions, the emphasis on deterrence over punishment,
and the express provision for pleading on information and belief.
There is no doubt that Rule 11 got some of its teeth pulled in 1993,
and there were plenty of people at the time who feared what the
consequences of that might be.44 Justice Scalia, in his famous
dissent to the transmittal of the rule change to Congress, argued that
the creative dentistry of the Judicial Conference had rendered the
new Rule 11 "toothless," and he feared that the new provisions,
particularly the safe harbor, would permit unscrupulous litigants to
"file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure in the
knowledge that they have nothing to lose... _,,4s These feelings were
sufficiently strong that attempts were made in Congress, as part of
the "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995" to legislatively
abolish the safe harbor provisions and essentially restore Rule 11 to
its pre-1993 form. 46 These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. 47
Ten years later, these debates and concerns no longer seem
nearly as urgent as they once did. In part, this is just the sobering
recognition that we, as a nation, currently have more serious
problems to contend with than frivolous litigation. Yet even among
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
43. Barber, 146 F.3d at 710-11; see Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d
288, 295 (6th Cir. 1997). See generally In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323
F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (barring award of sanctions when defendant did not
comply with safe harbor provision).
44. See Barber, 146 F.3d at 710-11.
45. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D.
501, 507--08 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. H.R. l 0, l 04th Cong. § 205 (1995).
47. Congress did succeed in passing a version of mandatory sanctions with
no safe harbor legislation, but it was applicable solely to securities litigation as
part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Pub. L. No. 10467, § 21D(c)(2), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2000)).
.
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those who remain concerned about the proper functioning of the
federal courts and the civil justice system, Rule 11 no longer comes
close to the top of the list of pressing problems. A simple recitation
of recent changes to the Federal Rules tells some of the story. Since
1993 there have been substantial revisions to both the discovery rules
and rules governing class actions,48 while Rule 11 has remained
unchanged.
We have more direct evidence, however, that the changes made
in 1993 appear to have satisfied many of the major participants in the
system by engendering a decline both in sanctions motions and in
frivolous filings. An article in the March 1995 American Bar
Association Journal, focusing primarily on the Northern District of
Illinois,49 declared that "sanctions litigation" (i.e. motions pursuant
to Rule 11) was "dying."50 One Northern District of Illinois judge,
who said she used to hear "dozens" of Rule 11 cases annually, had
not received one sanctions motion since the 1993 amendments took
effect. 51 Research by Jenner & Block, a major Chicago-based
defense firm, found a thirty-four percent drop in sanctions motions in
the first year after the 1993 amendments took effect. 52
While the evidence of a drop in sanctions motions was clear and
direct, the evidence of a decrease in frivolous filings was not. Some
advocates continued to argue, like Justice Scalia, for a return to the
old, stricter Rule 11. 53 Yet there were some encouraging signs here
as well. Attorneys began using the safe harbor provision. Judge
Conlon of the Northern District of Illinois saw more attorneys
withdrawing lawsuits, apparently as a result of the safe harbor
rules. 54 Another hopeful observation was that since the 1993
amendments took effect, there seemed to be less name-calling,

48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 26, 30, 37 (Proposed Amendments March 27,
2003),
available
at
http://
www .supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv03p.pdf.
49. Duncan, supra note 16.
50. Id
51. Id. (discussing U.S. District Court Judge Suzanne Conlon's comment
made more than one year after the Rule 11 changes took effect).
52. Id
53. Id (statement of Paul Kamenar of the Washington Legal Foundation
that "The relaxation [in Rule 11] basically gave the bar the impression they
could go back to their old ways.").
54. Id
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shouting, and personal attacks on opposing counsel. 55
Such
newfound amity among opposing counsel seems to contradict, at
least to some degree, the prediction that the mellowing of Rule 11
would unleash a new wave of frivolous litigation.
Further support for the view that the effects of the 1993
amendments were salutary and mild was provided by a survey of
federal judges and practitioners conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center in the period following enactment of the 1993 amendments. 56
Some of the headlines from that study, the only major one that has
been conducted in the post-1993 period, are that most judges and
lawyers now strongly oppose any attempt to restore Rule 11 to its
pre-1993 state,57 ( despite the fact that a 1991 study of federal judges
had found that eighty percent wanted to retain Rule 11 in its thenpresent form), 58 and that most judges did not think that groundless
litigation was any more of a problem post-1993 than it was prior to
1993 59 ( although most judges did not think groundless litigation was
much of a problem in 1991 either.)60 Finally, there was general
agreement that the post-1993 amendments had substantially reduced
the problem of satellite litigation.61
All of the evidence concerning post-1993 Rule 11, in short,
confirmed my general impression that it had been a major success. I
was a little concerned, however, by the fact that all of my evidence
dated from no later than 1995. Here we are, in 2003, having a
symposium to discuss ten years of perspectives on the 1993
amendments to Rule 11, and my empirical research seems to be stuck
somewhere in the George Stephanopoulos period of the Clinton
administration.
Obviously there was a need for some more recent research on
the effects of amended Rule 11 up to the present day. While I was
55. Id.
56. FJC 1995 Report, supra note 25, at l.
57. Id. at 2, 9-10.
58. Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., Federal Judicial Center, Rule 11: Final
Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States (1991) [hereinafter FJC Final Report].
59. See FJC 1995 Report, supra note 25, at 2-3.
60. See generally FJC Final Report, supra note 58 (indicating that threequarters of the responding judges thought groundless litigation was only a
small problem).
61. See FJC 1995 Report, supra note 25, at 2-3.
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perfectly willing to engage in the complex number-crunching,
statistically sophisticated data analysis that has become such an eyeglazing part of the current academic scene, I found that I lacked two
basic resources. The first was the money to afford the graduate
students needed to count data points, as well as the sophisticated
software needed to analyze, undress and regress that data. The
second thing I think I lacked was any idea how to do that stuff.
Undeterred, however, I embarked on my own quick and dirty
empirical research, armed with the only research tools I could afford,
and with which I have a limited, if imperfect understanding, LexisNexis and Google.
It seemed to me that the proper Lexis search should give me
some insight into the state of sanctions litigation in the post-1993
decade. Had they dropped dramatically in 1994 and then leveled
off? Continued to drop, or crept back up? Limiting myself to the
federal district court cases (to minimize double counting of the same
case), I tried to create a Lexis search request that would pick up only
federal district court cases that actually granted or denied Rule 11
motions. I failed miserably.62 I decided instead to try vastly
overinclusive search terms. I knew that this would pick up not only
cases that decided Rule 11 motions, but also cases that talked about
prior Rule 11 motions, that distinguished the present motion from a
Rule 11 motion, or that just expressed general views on Rule 11
motions. However, it seemed to me that this would be equally true
in the pre- and post-1993 periods, so that a comparison of the
number of cases picked up by the overinclusive search terms might
still provide some useful information. Amazingly enough, I think it
did. Listed on the following page are the number of cases containing
the overinclusive search terms (sanctions w/10 Rule 11) and (Rule 11
w/3 motion) for every year from 1988 to 2002.

62. The search tenn I came up with was: (Rule 11 motion w/10 granted) or
(Rule 11 motion w/10 denied). This turned out to be vastly underinclusive,
picking up only 25 cases in 1988, 24 in 1989, and 12 each in 1990 and 1991.
Obviously, courts were ruling on Rule 11 motions using lots of language that
was not being picked up in my search tenns. The number of cases picked up in
each year since using that search tenn was as follows: 1992:18, 1993:14,
1994:17, 1995:13, 1996:7, 1997:20, 1998:9, 1999: 13, 2000:6, 2001:13,
2002:15. I decided that the cases identified by this kind of search tenn were
just too small and random to provide any useful data.

Winter 2004] HINDSIGHT, REGRET, & SAFE HARBORS
YEAR

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

"Sanctions w/10
Rule 11"
505
506
546
544
547
501
387
334
306
299
286
253
241
215
251
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"Rule 11 w/3
motion"
214
229
240
225
262
211
165
144
129
154
130
118
125
97
119

This data, which is quite consistent for both search terms,
appears to show a major reduction in sanctions cases with the
introduction of the 1993 amendments, 63 with a gradual reduction in
cases continuing since that time. In short, my quick and dirty
empirical research appears to confirm the general impression of
pretty much everybody else: that the 1993 amendments have
succeeded in substantially reducing sanctions litigation under Rule
11.64
But with this diminution in sanctions motions, has there been an
increase in frivolous filings? That, of course, was the great fear of
Justice Scalia and others, and the data on Rule 11 motions alone
cannot provide a definitive answer. On the one hand, the drop in
sanctions motions under Rule 11 seems inconsistent with a
substantial increase in Rule 11 violations. But perhaps Rule 11 has
63. The amendments became effective on December 1, 1993, so their effect
is presumably seen in the 1994 data.
64. Because the 1993 amendments also removed discovery motions from
the ambit of Rule 11 sanctions, placing them instead within the purview of
Rule 26(g), I also searched (Rule 26(g) w/3 motion) to see whether a
significant number of sanctions motions were now being pursued under that
Rule. They aren't. My search turned up no more than two cases in any given
year, and zero cases in most years.
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truly been rendered so ''toothless" that although there has been a big
surge in the number of frivolous filings, lawyers are not bothering to
seek sanctions against them, but are simply defeating them on the
merits. 65
The 1995 Federal Judicial Center study indicated
otherwise, but it was somewhat out of date and perhaps partially
influenced by the general judicial view that groundless litigation was
not much of a problem. 66
It occurred to me, however, that if there has been such an
increase in frivolous filings, there would likely be some lawyers
complaining about it, and the lawyers most likely to be complaining
about it would be those lawyers who were complaining about it back
in 1993. AccordinSly, I decided to examine the websites of the
Manhattan Institute, 7 the Cato Institute,68 and the Washington Legal
Foundation,69 three of the strongest advocates of litigation reform
and critics of the contemporary civil justice system. I wanted to
examine their current positions on legal reform, to see how large a
role frivolous litigation and Rule 11 played in the contemporary
concerns of these groups.
I came away with the strong impression that these groups are far
more concerned these days with successful litigation by plaintiffs'
lawyers, as embodied in cases like asbestos and tobacco, than they
are with frivolous litigation by such plaintiffs' lawyers. The
Manhattan Institute's legal policy reform website70 is primarily
concerned with curbing class action litigation in the mass tort area,
particularly in such fields as asbestos and medical malpractice. 71
Their concern over "out of control tort awards" and asbestos suits
that have "bankrupted over 60 companies" makes it clear that we are
not talking about meritless litigation in the Rule 11 sense. 72 When I
searched for "frivolous litigation" on their website, I found one
article advocating that the United States adopt a more European

65. FJC 1995 Report, supra note 25, at 2-3.
66. Id
67. Manhattan Inst., at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/clp.htm
[hereinafter Manhattan Inst. Web site].
68. Cato Inst., at http://www.cato.org/ [hereinafter Cato Inst. Web site].
69. Washington Legal Foundation, at http://www.wlf.org.
70. Manhattan Inst. Web site, supra note 67.
71. Id
72. Id
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approach to products liability. 73 When I searched for "Rule 11" I
found nothing relevant. The Cato Institute website74 told basically
the same story. A search for "frivolous litigation" turned up five
papers, one each on tobacco litigation, firearms, securities class
actions, medical device litigation, and an attack on the jurisprudence
of the California Supreme Court. 75 A search of the Washington
Legal Foundation's website turned up a piece on employment
. dispute arbitration and some real articles on Rule 11 and frivolous
litigation which dated back to the 1992-1993 period. 76
In short, it appears quite clear that frivolous litigation in the Rule
11 sense-that is, cases that have no chance of winning-is not a
primary focus of conservative law reform groups these days. They
are understandably more exercised by cases brought by plaintiffs'
lawyers (and increasingly by state attorneys general), which they are
either winning or settling for large amounts. Frivolous litigation and
Rule 11 reform, however, have pretty much dropped off their radar
screen. Like Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not bark, 77 it is
reasonable to conclude that ten years after the 1993 revisions to Rule
11, frivolous litigation (at least of the unsuccessful variety) no longer
appears to be a major problem for corporate America.
The empirical evidence therefore confirms the general
impression of success. The 1993 revisions did indeed reduce
sanctions motions, satellite litigation, and the enmity among the
73. Stephen B. Presser, How Should the Law of Products Liability Be
Harmonized?: What Americans Can Learn From Europeans, 2 GLOBAL
LIABILITY ISSUES (Feb. 2002) at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
htmVgli_2.htm.
74. Cato Inst. Web site, supra note 68.
75. That last article did indeed argue that frivolous lawsuits were far more
common in California than in other states. Steven Hayward, Golden Lawsuits
in the Golden State, Cato Inst., at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regvl 7n3/regl 7n3-hayward.html.
76. Hank Brown, Proposal To Weaken Rule 11 's Attorney Sanction
Provisions Could Stimulate Frivolous Litigation, Counsel's Advisory, (Wash.
Legal Found., Washington D.C.) (July 23, 1993); Honorable Malcolm J.
Howard, Rule 11-An Appropriate Way For Dealing With Frivolous
Litigation, Legal Opinion Letter, (Wash. Legal Found., Washington D.C.)
(Mar. 6, 1992).
77. AR.THUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES (1901), available at http://www.geocities.com/fa1931/british/
conandoy/blaze.html.
The story "Silver Blaze" whose copyright has
apparently expired, is also available on a number of websites.
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lawyers that it engendered, yet appear to have done so without
encouraging a major resurgence of frivolous litigation. It succeeded
where many predicted it would fail, and succeeded so well that Rule
11 has ceased to be a major law reform issue. Yet the precise
method by which this success has been achieved remains unclear.
Precisely how and why did the 1993 revisions reduce the need and
incentives for lawyers to bring Rule 11 motions, and how did the
revised Rule manage to reduce sanctions motions while also
reducing, or at least not significantly increasing, frivolous filings?
Those are the questions considered in the next two sections of this
Article.
Ill. HINDSIGHT IN THE AoJUDICATION OF RULE 11 MOTIONS

There is considerable evidence that the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 brought about a relatively sharp and immediate reduction in
the number of Rule 11 motions being made. 78 What is far less clear
is why that occurred. Many commentators had predicted just the
opposite result, that weakened sanctions would lead to more
frivolous filings and therefore more Rule 11 motions. 79 Why that has
not occurred requires further consideration of both the monetary and
non-monetary incentives involved in filing frivolous litigation and in
seeking sanctions against such filings.
Begin with the virtually universal agreement that the 1993
amendments substantially reduced sanctions litigation, that is, Rule
80
11 motions, and in particular obviated the problem of in te"orem
Rule 11 motions designed to chill or deter potentially meritorious
claims. What distinguishes an in te"orem Rule 11 motion from a
fine, upstanding motion? Presumably, the difference depends on
what kind of filing the motion attacks. A proper Rule 11 motion
attacks (and presumably only deters) filings that are truly baseless or
frivolous. 81 In contrast, an in te"orem motion is aimed at (and
potentially chills) relatively weak, but not frivolous claims, which
78. See Duncan, supra note 16.
79. See, e.g., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 501, 507--08 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kobayashi & Parker, supra
note 31.
80. See generally Duncan, supra note 16 (stating that declining sanctions
litigation is attributable to Rule 11 amendments).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(b).
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the claimant believes have a reasonable chance of success. 82 The
willingness of defendants to make such motions, and plaintiffs' fear
of being faced with, and sometimes losing them, allegedly deterred
plaintiffs in the pre-1993 period from bringing claims they
considered to have substantial merit, particularly civil rights
actions. 83
Yet it is hard to see how the explicit changes in Rule 11 deterred
such motions or made them less worth bringing. It is true that the
1993 amendments reduced the availability of monetary sanctions, so
that most successful Rule 11 motions would end in a less expensive,
but still painful and embarrassing, sanction. 84 But, as noted
previously, money is rarely the sole reason for bringing such
motions. 85 For most defendants, an authoritative judicial finding that
the case against the defendants was without legal or factual basis
would seem, in itself, to be a result worth pursuing. 86 The possibility
of an additional sanction or monetary award against the other side
would be just icing on the cake, and it would constitute additional
reasons to bring such motions. The safe harbor provision, far from
82. The notion that in terrorem Rule 11 motions are more coercive than
others cannot withstand analysis. All Rule 11 motions are coercive in that they
seek to prevent the filing of certain types of claims. Such deterrence is the
very purpose of Rule 11 . The only viable difference, it seems to me, is
whether such coercive measures are directed at totally frivolous or baseless
claims or against those which have some merit.
83. See Tobias, supra note 8, at 172. One of the most important and
troubling findings of the studies of pre-1993 Rule 11 was the finding by the
American Judicature Society that 19.3% of practicing lawyers said that Rule
11 had deterred them, in the past year, from filing claims or defenses they
believed to be meritorious. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact
ofRule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 961-62 (1992).
84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993
amendment; see also Tobias, supra note 8, at 209 (stating that those in charge
of revising Rule 11 in 1993 sought to limit pecuniary sanctions).
85. See supra notes 1~13 and accompanying text.
86. While there were indications in pre-1993 studies of Rule 11 that high
monetary sanctions were primarily responsible for "satellite litigation" under
Rule 11, this primarily was a finding that lawyers would appeal from or
otherwise challenge large monetary sanctions imposed on them under Rule 11,
while they would accept weaker or non-monetary sanctions without further
litigation. THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE RULE 11
SANCTIONING PROCESS 3-5 (1988). There was no finding that lawyers were
less willing to bring sanctions motions in low sanctioning districts than in high
ones.
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being a deterrent to in terrorem motions, would seem to be a help,
since it gives frightened plaintiffs an easy and relatively painless way
to surrender their problematic, although potentially meritorious,
claims.
The deterrent effect of in terrorem motions, however, could
have been relatively easily reduced simply by raising the standard of
baselessness or frivolousness that must be shown to establish a
violation of Rule 11. 87 If only the very weakest, most baseless or
most frivolous claims were consistently subject to sanctions under
Rule 11, then the threat of in terrorem motions against weak, but
potentially meritorious cases, would largely disappear. Although
defendants might still make in terrorem motions, the motions will
most likely fail and thus would gradually cease to be a threat. The
problem is that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 do not, by their
terms, change the standard for finding a violation of Rule 11. 88
Although the language of Rule 11 (b), which sets forth these
standards, was substantially rewritten, the changes were primarily for
clarity and organization, and did not appear significantly to change
prior law. 89 Rule 1 l(b)(l)'s requirement that the filing was not
presented "for any improper purpose" had long been a part of Rule
11.90 Rule ll(b)(2) now required that the legal contentions be
"warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law,"91 while the old Rule had required that the
legal contentions be "warranted by existing law or a good faith
87. I do not know whether this would be considered "raising" or "lowering"
the standards for Rule 11 violations, but the basic idea is to make it harder to
establish that a given filing violates the standards of Rule 1 l(b).
88. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11 with FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) (amended
1993).
89. The 1993 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 1 l(b) and (c) says that:
"The subdivisions restate the provisions requiring attorneys . . . to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written
motions, and other [instruments].
The revision in part expands the
responsibilities oflitigants to the court, while providing greater constraints and
flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory
committee's note to 1993 amendment (emphasis added). It appears, therefore,
that the drafters of the 1993 amendments saw these amendments as expanding
potential liability under Rule 11 while allowing judges greater flexibility in
sanctioning violations.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993).
91. FED. R. CIV.P.11.
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argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."92 Although the 1993 amendments substitute the objective
standard of "nonfrivolous" argument for the arguably subjective
standard of good faith, this would appear to make the standard
stricter and thus the likelihood of finding a violation greater. 93 The
standard for factual allegations under ll(b)(3) was changed from a
requirement that they be "well grounded"94 to a requirement that they
"have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery."95 Yet even this change appears
primarily to accommodate plaintiffs who wish to plead certain facts
on information and belief. In short, solely by comparing the
language of pre- and post-1993 versions of Rule 11, one cannot
easily assert that the 1993 amendments made it significantly more
difficult to win a Rule 11 motion or show that a claim violated Rule
11 requirements.
Yet, I believe the 1993 amendments had precisely the effect of
making it significantly more difficult to win a Rule 11 motion. The
amendments did so, however, not primarily by changing the
substantive standard under Rule 11 (b), but by changing the time at
which such motions can be made pursuant to 1l(c) and, in particular,
by making it impossible for defendants to file such motions after the
courts adjudicate the merits of the claim. 96 This has deprived both
judges and litigants of the "hindsight perspective" on the merits of
these claims, thereby making it significantly less likely that judges
will find such claims to be violative of Rule 11.
The hindsight perspective, frequently called the "hindsight
bias," is one of the most widespread and powerful of the behavioral

92. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993).
93. The change in 1983 from a purely subjective standard to an objective
one was seen as the primary way to make the Rule more "stringent." See FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment; see also Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) ("For the
language of the new Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an
affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the
viability of a pleading before it is signed. Simply put, subjective good faith no
longer provides the safe harbor it once did.").
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983)(amended 1993).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.

622

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:599

heuristics discovered by cognitive psychologists studying behavioral
theory. 97 Knowledge and understandinfi of these heuristics is slowly
making its way into the legal academy. 8 The hindsight perspective,
broadly speaking, is the tendency of mostieople to view past events
as more probable than they really were.
While the concept that
"hindsight is 20/20" m~ have been part of conventional folk
wisdom for many years, 1 the first empirical demonstrations of the
hindsight bias were described by Baruch Fischhoff in 1975. 101
Fischhoff's seminal experiment involved describing a little known
war between the British and Nepalese Gurkhas to a group of
experimental subjects, a war that was variously described as having
four different outcomes. 102 Four groups of subjects were each told
97. A basic source for much of this work is Baruch Fischhoff, For Those
Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
JUOOMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335-51 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight].
Fischhoff's initial work on the hindsight bias actually appears in some earlier
pieces. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight 'I- Foresight: The Effect of
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 288 (1975) [hereinafter Fischhoff, Hindsight -:I- Foresight].
98. See Guthrie, supra note 30, at 185-95; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of
Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 225-55 (2000);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1085 (2000); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 735-46 (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis ofLaw, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Laws ofFear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (reviewing PAUL
SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)). For a critique and analysis of
much of this work, see Charles M. Yablon, The Meaning of Probability
Judgments: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2004).
99. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571,576 (1998).
100. Id. at 571.
101. See Fischhoff, Hindsight-:/:- Foresight, supra note 97, at 289. For other
discussions of research on hindsight bias, see Jay J. J. Christensen-Sz.alanski &
Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid
Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are
Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990).
102. Those outcomes were: (1) British win; (2) Gurkha win; (3) stalemate
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that a different one of the four outcomes had actually occurred. They
were then asked to estimate the "probability of occurrence" of each
of the four outcomes. 103 A fifth group of subjects was asked the
same question, but was not told which outcome had actually
occurred. 104 Subjects who believed that one outcome had occurred
tended to assign much higher ex ante probabilities to that outcome,
relative to the subjects who were not told which outcome
occurred. 105 Through this and other studies, Fischhoff concluded
that the increase in probability estimates that result from knowing
that an event actually occurred is between 6.3 and 44 percentage
points. 106
The causes of the hindsight bias remain unclear and
controversial, but the strongest contending explanation is based on a
cognitive theory that Fischhoff called "creeping determinism." 107
The concept should be familiar to anyone who has ever watched a
close football game, decided, perhaps, by a long field goal in the last
minute of play. The teams may have seemed evenly matched
throughout the game, with the lead shifting back and forth during the
game, and the outcome impossible to predict. Yet, as soon as the
winner is known, the game analysts begin to point out all the things
the winning team did right (e.g., better pass protection, more first
downs), and all the things the losing team did wrong (e.g.,
inadequate running game}, until the winner's victory begins to look
inevitable, and everybody pretty much forgets that the game was
won by a lucky kick. In a similar vein, Fischhoff found that the more
information he provided about the causes of the outcome that was
said to have occurred, the more probable that outcome seemed to his
subjects. 108
with peace agreement; and (4) stalemate with no peace agreement. Fischhoff,

Hindsight-:/= Foresight, supra note 97, at 289.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 290-93.
106. Id. at 290. Rachlinski also estimated that the hindsight bias "gives an
average of a 15 percent 'boost' to the assessed probability" of negligence in
most tort cases. Rachlinski, supra note 99, at 606.
107. Fischhoff, Hindsight-:/= Foresight, supra note 97, at 288.
108. Careful theorists also distinguish "hindsight bias" from "outcome bias."
Hindsight bias, as we have seen, affects a subject's supposed ex ante judgment
of the probability of a given event. Outcome bias occurs when knowledge of a
bad outcome causes people, in hindsight, to judge more harshly the action
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Rachlinski cites other findings of the empirical studies of
hindsight bias that provide support for the "creeping determinism"
theory. He states:
Materials that directly attribute the outcome to an
occurrence unrelated to any of the antecedents do not
produce a hindsight bias. For example, subjects reading the
British-Gurkha conflict who were told that the Nepalese
won due to a freak snow storm did not rate a Nepalese
victory as more likely than subjects who were not told the
outcome of the conflict. Creeping determinism also
explains why adding more information increases the size of
the bias; the more antecedent facts that can be integrated
into an explanation for the outcome, the more inevitable it
will seem. This theory also accounts for the finding that
materials describing the occurrence of an event produce a
larger hindsight bias than materials stating that an event did
not occur; occurrences are generally easier to explain than
nonoccurrences. More so than any of the motivational
theories, Fischhoff's original hypothesis seems to account
for the pattern of data in the literature on the hindsight
bias. 109
Although there are some indications that judges exhibit a smaller
amount of hindsight bias than lay jurors, 1 0 there is no doubt that
judges are subject to hindsight bias. 111
It is easy to see the potential implications of these findings for
which led to that bad outcome. As Philip Peters notes, "When people know
that things turned out badly, they are more likely to believe that someone was
careless." Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding
Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1282 (1999). Yet, the two
heuristics clearly work together to affect a subject's evaluation of prior
decisions, and theorists have not been able to measure the independent effect
of each bias where they both occur. For the purposes of considering the effect
of knowledge of outcomes on a judge's determination of whether a Rule 11
violation· occurred, we can lump them together as part of the same hindsight
perspective that increases the likelihood that the initial filing will be viewed as
having had no chance of success.
109. Rachlinski, supra note 99, at 585-86.
110. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive
Damages Awards: Reply to Richard Lempert, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 987, 989
(2002).
111. See Guthrie et al., supra note 22, at 799-805.
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issues of law and litigation, but before discussing that, let us consider
the precise implications of a word frequently used in the behavioral
literature, but one freighted with content for lawyers-the
description of this perspective as a "bias." First of all, it should be
noted that "bias," as the cognitive psychologists use it, does not
mean "bias" in the legal sense of partiality or inability to adjudicate
fairly. Rather, it is a term that describes cognitive shortcuts (also
sometimes called "heuristics") that frequently lead to errors. 112 For
example, most people, if asked whether there are more English
words beginning with the letter R than there are English words with
R in the third position, will erroneously state that there are more
words that begin with R. 113 That error is probably due to the
"availability bias," the tendency to judge the frequency of something
by the ease with which it can be recalled. 114 Since most people can
more easily recall words beginning with R than words that have R in
the third position, they erroneously conclude that more such words
exist in the English language. 115
We can say this is an error, however, because we can actually
count the number of words with R in either the first or third position
in the English language. There is an objective right answer to that
question. When it comes to probability judgments concerning
individual events, however, there is no objectively ascertainable right
answer. How likely was it that the Union would win the American
Civil War? The question is unanswerable. Although historians can
debate whether, if events had taken place slightly differently, the
outcome of the Civil War might have been different, there is no way
to determine the true likelihood of any singular event which has
occurred, or even any accepted method for doing so. It is, however,
possible to ask questions about an individual's state of mind, and to
ask what a reasonably informed observer would have believed the
chances were for a Northern victory as of, say, 1860. This question
at least has a potential answer. However, it is not based on objective
facts about the situation in 1860, but on determining the subjective
112. See Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, supra note 97.
113. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 166-68 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
114. See id. at 166.
115. See id.
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beliefs of an informed and impartial observer at that time. 116
Accordingly, the "bias" described by "hindsight bias" is not
partiality, and not even a cognitive heuristic that frequently leads to
error. Rather, it is the consistent tendency of people who know that
certain events occurred to view those events as more probable than
other people making the same probability assessments who do not
know whether the events actually did or did not occur. Much of the
literature on hindsight bias assumes that the "unbiased" judgments of
those who do not know outcomes are "better" or more accurate than
those of people who know the outcome, but this is only true in a very
limited sense. 117 It is true only insofar as there are legal or other
normative grounds for seeking to ascertain what an impartial and
informed person would have jud~ed the probability of the event to be
before the outcome was known. 11
Tort doctrine and much tort theory says that determinations of a
defendant's negligence should be made by evaluating the riskiness of
the activity as of the time the defendant engaged in that risky
activity, not after the consequences of the activity have already
occurred. 119 Making similar determinations of liability in other areas
of law, like applications of the prudent investor rule, may require a
similar ex ante perspective. 12 For our purposes, however, the most

°

116. Because it is based on subjective belief and not objective fact, it is
possible for two informed and impartial observers to disagree about the
likelihood of an uncertain future event. Fe · example, at the beginning of the
game, one Mets fan may believe the team had a fifty percent chance of
winning. The other may think the Mets' chances were no better than twentyfive percent. There is no fact in the world, (including the Mets' subsequent
loss) which would enable anyone to demonstrate which of those two
probability estimates was more correct.
117. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 99, at 573-74.
118. As a general matter in learning about the world, most ofus would rather
know more than less. Knowing outcomes supplies us with additional
information, and enables us to learn from experience. The person who says,
"If I had known then what I know now ... [I would have acted differently]" is
not making an error, but simply reflecting the change in judgment based on
additional knowledge. It is only because we believe, in many legal and some
other circumstances, that it is normatively appropriate to judge people by what
they reasonably knew at a prior time (even if subsequent events would have
provided a better perspective) that we care so much about hindsight bias.
119. See Peters, supra note 108, at 1284.
120. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts:
Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 74-75 (2000).
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important point is that Rule 11 determinations also require such an ex
ante perspective.
The Rule clearly contemplates that the
determination of the reasonableness of the litigants' certification of
the evidentiary basis and nonfrivolousness of their claims must be
made as of the time of filing. 121
Purely coincidentally, a recent study of the hindsight bias in
federal magistrate judges utilized a hypothetical involving (of all
things) Rule 11. 122 A group of 167 federal magistrate judges were
involved in a test not unlike Fischhoff's original studies of the
hindsight bias. 123 They were given a description of a pro se section
1983 action by a prisoner in a state correctional facility, based on the
allegation that he had received "negligent medical treatment" at the
prison. 124 They were then informed that the district court had
dismissed the complaint, holding that negligent medical care did not
give rise to a section 1983 claim, and that plaintiff knew this because
the court had dismissed similar claims brought by him a few years
previously. 125
They were also informed that the judge had
sanctioned plaintiff under Rule 11, requiring that he get permission
of the Chief Judge of the district court before filing any more claims,
and that plaintiff had appealed. 126 Three different groups were then
told three different outcomes of the appeal: "Affirmed," "Lesser
Sanction" (the appeals court imposed a less onerous sanction on
plaintiff), or "Vacated" (the appeals court found an abuse of
discretion). 127 The subjects were then asked which of the three
results had, in their judgment, been most likely. 128 As in the Fischoff
experiments, 81.5 percent of the magistrate judges who were told the
case had been affirmed also viewed that as the most likely result. 129
121. See, e.g., CTC Imports and Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951
F.2d 573, 578 (3d Cir. 1991) (court "is expected to avoid the wisdom of
hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was
reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was
submitted." (quoting FED. R CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983
amendment)).
122. See Guthrie et al., supra note 22.
123. Id. at 778.
124. Id at 801.
125. Id.
126. Id at 801--02.
127. Id at 802.
128. Id
129. Id.
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Less than half of the judges in the other two groups, who believed
the case had been vacated or modified, viewed affirmance as the
most likely result. 130 In short, real judges, in a hypothetical based on
Rule 11, gave strong indications that they were influenced by the
hindsight bias. 131
In the real litigation world, however, the problem of hindsight
bias in Rule 11 is not primarily about influence on district courts by
appellate court decisions, but about hindsight bias on district court
judges based on their own prior adjudication of the merits. The first
commentator, to my knowledge, to raise the possibility of hindsight
bias in the adjudication of Rule 11 motions was Thomas Willging, in
his influential and important stud:f2 of the functioning of Rule 11 in
the post-1983, pre-1993 period. 1 2 Noting that many requests for
Rule 11 sanctions in that period were made without formal motions,
"perhaps in the prayer for relief at the end of a motion to dismiss,"
Willging comments that "[i]n this scenario, there may be a tendency
to merge the sanctions issue with the merits," and further notes,
"[c]ommon sense and empirically tested data demonstrate that
hindsight can have a powerful effect on legal decisions. " 133
The second commentator, to my knowledge, to raise the
possibility of hindsight bias in the adjudication of Rule 11 motions
was me. Describing the common pre-1993 scenario in which the
Rule 11 motion was being considered by the court after the judge had
decided the merits of the case, 134 I described a scenario not so
130. Guthrie noted: "[O]nly 27.8% of those told [that] the court of appeals
had vacated, and only 40.4% of those told [that] the court of appeals had
remanded for imposition of a lesser sanction, indicated that an affirmance was
the most likely outcome." Id
131. Id. at 802--03. I do not want to seem too much like a nit-picky Civil
Procedure teacher here, but the hypothetical was a little vague on some critical
procedural points. It sounded like the case was dismissed and then the Rule 11
motion was made and decided. This would be a violation of current Rule
1 l(c)(l)(A), unless the Rule 11 motion was made on the court's initiative
under Rule ll(c)(l)(B), which would then raise the issue recently decided by
the Second Circuit in In re Pennie & Edmonds, L.L.P., 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.
2003), concerning the proper mens rea standard to apply in such motions.
Alternatively, the magistrate judges might have assumed that the Rule 11
motion was properly made before the dismissal, and simply was being
described later.
132. WILLGING, supra note 86.
133. Id. at 87-88.
134. In Willging's study of the procedural stage at which a sample of
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different from the "creeping determinism" ofFischhoff:
A judge deciding a motion for sanctions is looking at a case
that has already been adjudicated and found to be without
merit. Although the law requires her to evaluate the case as
of the time it was initially brought, the judge, in fact, knows
a lot more than the lawyer did at that time. She knows the
facts and legal rules that were actually presented to the
court, and which ones turned out to be dispositive. Like a
reader who already knows how the mystery turns out, she
may discern significance in facts that the lawyer deciding
whether to file a claim had no reason to find especially
compelling.
This hindsight can affect a judge's view of what
constitutes "reasonable inquiry." 135
In most other areas of the law, eliminating hindsight bias is an
extremely difficult thing to do. Various theorists have proposed
bifurcating liability from damages in many tort trials (to avoid
focusing the jury on grisly outcomes), 136 expanded note taking and
questioning by jurors, 137 or closing arguments specifically designed
to debias jurors. 138 The drafters of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11,
however, had a much more elegant and effective solution. They
simply changed the timing rules for making these motions so that
such motions are now rarely adjudicated after the judge has decided

sanctions opinions were issued. he found forty percent issued with the decision
on a motion to dismiss, twelve percent after dismissal by the court, twentyseven percent during or after summary judgment, twelve percent after a court
trial, and only five percent each after a jury trial or settlement. Id at 77.
Accordingly, it seems fairly clear that the large majority of pre-1993 sanctions
motions were decided by judges either simultaneously with or quite soon after
they had ruled on the merits of the underlying action.
135. Yablon, supra note 14, at 78.
136. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The
Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587,
633 (1994); David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct
for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some
Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485,503 (1989).
137. See Peters, supra note 108, at 1308-09.
138. See Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the
Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LA w & HUM.
BEHAV. 671 , 682 (1998).
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the merits. 139
Under the 1993 version of Rule 11, and the subsequent case law,
parties cannot make Rule 11 motions after the merits of the case have
been decided, since that would deprive the opposing £iarty of their
safe harbor withdrawal rights under Rule l l(c)(l)(A). 1 According
to Willging's 1988 study, approximately fifty percent of all Rule 11
motions in the pre-1993 period occurred either after dismissal by the
court, after trial by the court, or during or after summary
judgment. 141 While it is still theoretically possible to time a Rule 11
motion so that it comes before the court for adjudication at the same
time as a dispositive motion, this is difficult to do and not entirely
within the moving party's control. First, the Advisory Committee's
Note envisions that motions under current Rule 11 should ordinarily
"be served promptly after the inappropriate p~~ is filed, and, if
delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely. " 14 Second, if a party
serves the sanctions motion on the opposing party, hoping to wait out
the twenty-one days and then file the Rule 11 motion together with,
say, a potentially dispositive motion to dismiss, he will likely run
afoul of the time limits for making such motions. 143 Further, the
opposing party can always put a crimp in the timing by modifying
the challenged document, and thereby start the running of a new
twenty-one-day period. Third, at the very worst, the district judge
will have the Rule 11 motion before her at the same time she is
considering a ruling on the merits, not after she has made that
determination. 144
Accordingly, under the current version of Rule 11, no lawyer,
and relatively few judges, will know the outcome of the case when
considering the validity or likelihood of success of a Rule 11 motion.
By removing this substantial amount of hindsight bias from the
139. See supra Part III.
140. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment;
see also supra note 42-43 and accompanying text.
141. WILLGING, supra note 86, at 77 (noting that another forty percent were
made with a motion to dismiss).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
143. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)-(b) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim must be made within twenty days of service of the summons and
complaint, unless extended).
144. The one exception to this analysis, of course, may be motions made on
the court's initiative.
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decision-making process, the Rule achieves the same effect as if it
had significantly raised the standard for finding a Rule 11 violation.
The effect on judges is to remove that extra six, or fifteen or
forty percent likelihood of failure that they would ascribe to a claim
that they already knew had been, or would be, dismissed. By
considering most Rule 11 motions at a time when the outcome of the
case is not known, judges come closer to the ex ante perspective of
lawyers when they make their initial inquiry under Rule 11. Thus,
such judges are less likely to exhibit hindsight bias in evaluating the
lawyers' evaluation of the probability of success of their claims.
While it is true that the judge might form a strong opinion on the
merits of the case prior to the formal determination, virtually every
aspect of judicial process and training points the other way, instilling
in judges the need not to prejudge cases, and to remain open to
persuasion by evidence and legal authorities. Accordingly, it is
likely the judge will not have a strong view of the outcome of the
case when the Rule 11 motion comes before the judge. Thus, cases
that are weak, but potentially meritorious, are likely to be viewed as
precisely that, rather than seen, through the perspective of the
hindsight bias, as cases that had no chance from the beginning. The
in terrorem threat of Rule 11 motions directed at potentially
meritorious claims is therefore substantially reduced.
However, the hindsight bias does not work only on judges, but
on lawyers as well. In the pre-1993 period, a victorious lawyer,
having just won dismissal of a case, was likely to conclude, after
reading the judge's opinion, that his opponent really had no case at
all, and that the opposing lawyers should be sanctioned for having
the temerity to argue such a weak case. Such motions might well
have looked like vindictive, in te"orem litigation to the opponents.
Under current Rule 11 timing requirements, such a scenario simply
cannot occur. A lawyer or litigant can only bring a Rule 11 motion
before the outcome of the case is known.1 45
These timing requirements not only affect the judge's
perspective on the merits of the Rule 11 motion but the perception of
the likelihood of success of a potential Rule 11 motion on the
lawyers who are considering whether to bring it. Cases that pose
some actual litigation threat will not appear to such lawyers to be
145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
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completely frivolous or baseless, nor to be the likely subjects of
winning Rule 11 motions. The effect of all of this, of course, is to
make it significantly less likely that litigants will make or win Rule
11 motions against claims with some potential merit, thereby
reducing the number of Rule 11 motions made and their in terrorem
threat to potentially meritorious claims.
We can see then that the 1993 amendments did, in fact, make it
significantly harder to win Rule 11 motions against marginal filings
and claims, but it did so in a particularly subtle (and perhaps
unexpected) way. By changing the time at which most Rule 11
motions must be made, the new Rule insures that hindsight bias will
not be a factor in most judicial determinations of whether or not a
claim is frivolous or baseless. Accordingly, not-yet-adjudicated
claims are substantially less likely to be found to have no chance of
success than the same claims viewed under a hindsight perspective.
The effect is the same as that which would have been achieved if the
standard for proving Rule 11 violations had been substantially raised,
and it is the one noted in Part II of this article-a substantial
reduction in the amount of reported Rule 11 litigation.

N. REGRET AND THE RULE 11 SAFE HARBOR
Reducing Rule 11 motions, particularly in terrorem Rule 11
motions, may well be a worthwhile achievement. However, to do so
without substantially increasing the number of frivolous filings is an
even happier and far more surprising result, a bit like discovering
that you have fewer bugs in your garden when you stop spraying it
with insecticide. 146 Yet reliable accounts of the effect of the 1993
amendments tell us that such happy results have indeed been
achieved and that the decrease in Rule 11 motions has not
engendered any increase in frivolous filings. 147 The purpose of this
section is to try to figure out why that might be so. The answer, I

146. Unfortunately, this does not happen. The converse however, lots of bug
spray leading to lots of spray-resistant bugs, is a serious concern. William J.
Broad, In War Against Mosquito, Man Is Losing Ground, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1984, at C-1.
147. See FJC 1995 Report, supra note 25, at 2 ("A very large majority of
respondents agree that some form of Rule 11 is needed, suggesting that those
who regard the problem with groundless litigation as small believe Rule 11
keeps it from being a larger problem.").
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submit, lies in the fact that most people who make frivolous filings
never intended to make such filings in the first place, and therefore
have little incentive, even with a reduced likelihood of sanctions, to
file any more of them.
Why lawyers and litigants make frivolous filings is itself a
complex and somewhat puzzling question. Unlike other violations of
legal rules, like theft or income tax evasion, it is far from clear what
benefit, if any, a person who engages in frivolous litigation derives
from such activity. With much work and many assumptions, certain
legal theorists have been able to develop models under which it
would sometimes be in the best interests of unscrupulous litigants to
bring lawsuits that they know have no basis in law or fact. These
models rely on assumed information and litigation cost asymmetries
between plaintiffs and defendants. The basic notion is that the party
(or lawyer) filing the claim knows that it is without merit, but also
knows that it will be costly for the opposing party, through discovery
or otherwise, to acquire the relevant information and use it to get the
case dismissed. 148 If the defendants are "rational" in an economic
sense, (i.e. inclined to take the least costly course of action), they will
settle such claims for any amount less than the risk-adjusted cost of
litigating them. 149
There are, of course, some questions that can be raised
concerning this model. Is it really in the interests of defendants and
defense counsel to settle questionable claims solely to avoid greater
litigation costs? Is not the reputational value of winning, as opposed
to merely settling, worth something more to defendants, particularly
where the claims brought by the plaintiff seem questionable and
defendants have a good chance of winning? Defendant's lawyers
(who are presumably advising Defendant on whether to settle or
litigate) are also likely to prefer winning to settling a weak case.
They may even view defendant's litigation costs (most of which,
after all, go into their pockets as attorneys' fees) less as unnecessary
148. See Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 31, at 119 ("A key assumption
motivating the analysis is the existence of 'asymmetric information'-rneaning
that, until the court's decision after stage E [when the court decides the Rule 11
motion], the plaintiff has more information about the frivolousness or
nonfrivolousness of its own complaint than does the defendant."); see also
Bebchuk, supra note 31; Rosenberg & Shaven, supra note 31.
149. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 511-23 (3d ed.
1986).
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transactions costs and more like money well spent.
The makers of models can always respond that these concerns
may reflect the cost-benefit analysis in particular cases, but not the
validity of the overall model. That is true enough, but doubt about
the real world likelihood of defendants being willing to settle weak
cases just to avoid litigation costs does raise the question of how
many real life frivolous filings are brought for the reasons suggested
by these informationally asymmetric models. Let us assume for
now, however, that it is some number greater than one. Accordingly,
some number of frivolous filings are brought by people who know
their claims are frivolous (or at least very weak) but are trying to
prevent the other side from finding that out. Since these litigants'
motivation depends on misleading the opposing parties, we can label
this category of frivolous filers ''tricksters."
Another category of litigants who have a motivation to make
frivolous filings is that comprised of those who do not care whether
they win or lose. This is perhaps a larger category than one might
think. Theoreticians sometimes talk about the expressive function of
law and litigation, as well as the more mundane compensatory,
remedial, deterrent, and punitive ones. 15 Courts, after all, are one of
the few places in modem American society where a single individual
can raise challenges and objections to perceived wrongs before a
government official authorized to hear and rule in a fair and
judicious manner. "Having one's day in court" does not imply
litigation success, or even a reasonable chance of success, but rather
only a right to have one's claims heard and decided in accordance
with due process. Accordingly, the person who wants to argue that
there is a constitutional right to affordable housing, that
discrimination against blondes is covered by the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 151 or that the federal income tax is
unconstitutional, 152 may very well seek to do so, even while
recognizing that their claims are objectively frivolous. We can
categorize these people as "Don Quixotes" 153 after that great tilter at

°

150. See Sunstein, supra note 32.
151. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12-112 (1990).
152. Orndoff v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 93-15804, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14865, at •1 (9th Cir. May 24, 1994).
153. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE INGENIOUS HIDALGO 00N
QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA (John Rutherford trans., Penguin Books 2001 ).
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windmills, recognizing that they represent a continuum from
princ~led practitioners of civil disobedience who seek to violate the
law 15 to spread awareness of societal inequities, to cranks and cults
with powerful views of what the law should be, to vexatious
litigators who just refuse to take no for an answer. What unites them
all is an awareness (which may be rather dim in the consciousness of
some) that their claims are objectively frivolous under the current
state of the law and the fact that they do not care whether or not that
is so. 155
Unlike the tricksters and the Don Quixotes, the third category of
people who might bring frivolous claims do not do so intentionally,
but, in essence, negligently. These are the sloppy, busy, lazy, or
harassed practitioners, who for one reason or other have not taken the
trouble to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the case to determine
whether it is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law.
Unlike the tricksters and Don Quixotes, they do not know that their
claims are frivolous, but with additional time and effort they could
have found out. Much contemporary commentary assumes that
many frivolous filings are the result of bad or sloppy lawyering by
this category of lawyers, whom we can label the "slackers." Indeed,
Rule 11 was often conceived of as a tool to educate, cajole, or
frighten less conscientious practitioners into acting in accordance
with their professional responsibilities. As Professor Vairo notes,
''these [Rule 11] motions often targeted what many in the bench and
bar believe to be unprofessional or incompetent conduct that
previously had been ignored by organized bar discipline. Indeed,
there can be no argument that Rule 11 has changed lawyer conduct in
some significantly positive ways." 156 Because Rule 11 embodies an
objective standard, this category of "slacker" includes not only those
154. Knowingly filing a claim in violation of Rule 11 is, after all, a form of
law breaking, albeit a fairly benign one.
155. Some people who might be thought to fit this description (and who have
incurred substantial Rule 11 sanctions) are Julius Chambers, later the DirectorCounsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund; Blue v. United States Dep't of
the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); In
re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969 (1991);
and the Christie Institute, which acted as counsel for the plaintiffs in Avirgan
v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989), ajf'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 (1992).
156. Vairo, supra note 20, at 590.
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lawyers too lazy to conduct a reasonable investigation, but also those
who are too inexperienced or lack the ability to do so, or those who
just made an honest mistake after a hard night of partying. 157 What
unites the people in this category is their lack of an intention to make
a frivolous filing, and accordingly, their presumed willingness to
reconsider the filing when given further information about its
frivolousness.
A fourth and final category of potential filers of frivolous claims
are those who bring claims where the factual basis for liability is
quite weak or at least substantially unclear, but there is no way (at
least no relatively inexpensive and effective way) to get a better
assessment of the merits of the claim prior to filing it. Unlike the
slackers, these lawyers have investigated all the facts readily
ascertainable about the merits of their claim, and while there are no
facts clearly showing the claim to be baseless, there is also little or
no factual basis to support plaintiff's theory of liability. The case is a
questionable one, on the borderline of pleading, even on information
and belief. Yet, there is also the possibility, small but real, that
plaintiff's attorney might tum up facts, in discovery or otherwise, to
support the theory of liability. Such claims are worth bringing, in
terms of their economic rationality, because they usually involve
substantial damages, even if liability is 2-uestionable. Accordingly,
the case has a positive expected value, 15 and some lawyers will be
inclined to bring it irrespective of the risks involved. We can place
such lawyers in the category of "gamblers" 159-lawyers who bring
claims that, based on presently available information, are
"longshots," low probability claims with positive expected returns,
but which might tum out after further discovery and other litigation,

157. See id at 610-15; see also WILLGING, supra note 86, at 143-47
(finding that most attorneys sanctioned under the Rule were experienced and
had reputations at or above average in their communities).
158. That is, the (probability of success times the expected payout) minus
(litigation costs plus the probability of a sanction times the sanction amount) is
a positive number. See Yablon, supra note 14, at 85 n.50.
159. Chris Guthrie argues that some lawyers and plaintiffs may bring
frivolous claims because they systematically overestimate the probability of
success of the weak claim due to a number of cognitive biases. See Guthrie et
al., supra note 22, at 165-69. These litigants should also be categorized as
"gamblers" (although perhaps not very good ones) because they have taken the
calculated risk of filing low probability claims.
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to have either considerable merit or, more likely, to have no
substantial basis in law or fact.
These four categories seem pretty much to cover the kinds of
circumstances where lawyers and litigants might bring frivolous
litigation. They describe a number of quite different motivations,
dispositions, and states of mind. Note, for example, that the first two
categories, tricksters and Don Quixotes, intentionally bring cases
they know to be frivolous. The latter two categories, on the other
hand, the slackers and gamblers, do not know their claims are
frivolous when brought, and indeed bring them in the hope they will
have merit.
With regard to susceptibility to large monetary
sanctions, it should be noted that only the tricksters and gamblers are
pursuing strategies that, if successful, will earn them positive
monetary rewards. The trickster hopes to generate a positive
monetary settlement by making it costly for opposing counsel to
determine and prove that his claim is baseless. The gambler hopes to
file a portfolio of low probability claims, then pursue only those that
appear to have substantial merit, while abandoning or limiting costs
on the others. The Don Quixote, in contrast, is not seeking monetary
rewards, but ideological and expressive satisfaction. The slacker is
not seeking much of anything. He did not know the filing he was
making was frivolous, and is presumably chagrined by his mistake.
Consider now the likely effect on these different categories of
frivolous litigants to an increase or decrease in either the amount or
probability of sanctions for frivolous filings. The trickster and
gambler are directly and strongly affected by any increase in
sanctions. They are both pursuing diversification strategies in which
the positive returns from the successful claims (those which produce
a settlement for the trickster and those which turn out to have merit
for the gambler) outweigh the costs from the unsuccessful ones. An
increase in probability or amount of sanctions represents a direct
increase in the costs of pursuing a gambler or trickster strategy. It
means the trickster will pay more for every frivolous claim that is
discovered and proven in litigation rather than settled. The gambler
will pay more for each low probability claim that turns out to be
baseless. If the sanctions costs are set high enough, both these
strategies may no longer be worth pursuing. Conversely, if the
probability or amount of sanctions for frivolous filings is reduced, it
will directly increase the returns from the trickster and gambler
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strategies and therefore lead to more such filings.
The effect on Don Quixotes and slackers is much less clear and
direct. Since Don Quixotes are not pursuing their strategy for
financial reward, they always expect to incur some costs in
exercising their expressive rights in a federal court. An increase in
sanctions means those costs will go up, but this will not necessarily
change the litigation strategies of the Don Quixotes, many of whom
are likely to be judgment-proof. It is even less likely that a reduction
in sanctions will engender a substantial increase in such filings,
which are more likely to be a product of passion than cost-benefit
calculation. The effect on slackers is even more problematic. Since
they get no positive benefit from frivolous filings in the first place, it
is hard to imagine that increased sanctions will have more than
marginal effects on their already self-defeating behavior. Indeed, it
seems likely that for the inexperienced or easily distracted
practitioner, frequent reminders about Rule 11 may be a more
effective deterrent than increased sanctions. 160 Conversely, it is hard
to imagine that a decrease in Rule 11 sanctions will cause large
numbers of lawyers who now conduct reasonable inquiries into the
facts and law surrounding their claims to give up doing so.
This is not to deny that, at the margin, (that favorite location of
economic theory), increasing costs of frivolous litigation will result
in some reduction in such lawsuits (even among slackers and Don
Quixotes), while decreasing the likelihood or amount of sanctions
will (marginally) encourage frivolous suits. Rather, the point is that
the alacrity and the extent of the change in litigation behavior which
is brought about by these changes in monetary incentives will vary
greatly for different classes of litigants. One way to put it is that the
utility function for marginal changes in sanctions costs varies much
more for litigants in the trickster and gambler categories than for the
slackers and Don Quixotes. Since the former are, in effect, "in it for
the money," they are more likely to change their behavior
significantly in response to relatively small changes in the cost of
sanctions. Slackers and Don Quixotes, in contrast, are much less
likely to respond to a decrease in sanctions by increasing the number
of their frivolous filings. Accordingly, if all the 1993 changes to
160. This was presumably the implication of the comment by one federal
judge that it was the existence of Rule 11, not the sanctions, that was beneficial
in influencing lawyer conduct. See FJC Final Report, supra note 58, at 20.
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Rule 11 had done was decrease the amount and likelihood of
monetary sanctions for frivolous filings, the absence of a major
upsurge in frivolous filings post-1993 would suggest that most of the
litigants involved in Rule 11 litigation are not strongly responsive to
monetary incentives, that they are predominantly slackers and Don
Quixotes rather than tricksters and gamblers.
However, we know that the 1993 revisions did not only reduce
the amount and probability of sanctions for frivolous litigation. They
also created a new safe harbor for withdrawing frivolous filings.
Accordingly, we must extend our analysis to consider how this new
provision affected the various categories of litigants who may be
involved in Rule 11 motions. The key point to recognize about the
safe harbor provision of Rule 11 is its temporal dimension. It
presumes that there are some litigants who, while happy (or at least
willing) to initiate a frivolous claim or filing at time t (the date of
filing), are also happy (or at least willing) to abandon that claim or
filing at a later time t1 (the day after a Rule 11 motion is made
challenging the filing). In short, these are litigants who, at least from
the later perspective of a Rule 11 motion, can be said to regret having
made the frivolous filing. Such feelings of regret are also implicitly
assumed by the Advisory Committee's comment acknowledging
litigants who wanted to voluntarily withdraw their filings, but were
prevented from doing so by the threat of a subsequent Rule 11
motion. 161
What is the likely cause of such feelings of regret? Obviously,
developments in the litigation that have occurred between the filing
of the claim and the Rule 11 motion are the most likely cause. It is
very possible that the litigants will learn new facts about their claim,
either through discovery, defendant's motions, or the statements or
rulings of the trial judge, which, if they had been known at time t
would have dissuaded them from bringing the claim.
The litigants most likely to experience such feelings of regret are
the slackers and the gamblers, since they are the ones who did not
know at the time of original filing that their claims were frivolous.
For the slackers, learning facts which indicate that the claim has no
basis shows that they have made a "mistake," one that they
presumably regret and are more than happy to correct by
161. See FED. R CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
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withdrawing the claim. For the gamblers, learning that their claim
has no basis is like learning that they did not win the lottery,
disappointing but not truly surprising. Once that fact has been
learned, however, the gamblers are also more than willing to use the
safe harbor to discontinue their claims, writing them off as longshots
that did not pan out.
Don Quixotes and tricksters, however, will not be surprised by a
litigation process that shows their claims to be baseless. They knew
their claims were baseless when they started. For Don Quixotes, the
safe harbor provision should hold little attraction, since what they
want is the right to have their claim heard and adjudicated in a court
of law, presumably with the right to appeal to an even more
prestigious and powerful court.
The tricksters' incentives are the most complex. Tricksters
know their claims are baseless, but rely on the hope that the other
side does not have the same knowledge. The filing of a Rule 11
motion challenging their claim, however, is a pretty good indication
that the other side has, or believes it has, sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the tricksters' claim is baseless. At this point
tricksters have the same regret as the gamblers and the slackers, and
the same incentive to withdraw the claim.
There is, however, a significant difference, in that the filing of a
meritorious Rule 11 motion against the tricksters' filing represents a
failure of their strategy in a way that similar filings against slackers
or gamblers do not. The tricksters' strategy was to settle baseless
claims by convincing opponents that the cost of litigating was greater
than the cost of settling. An opponent who has made a Rule 11
motion has litigated sufficiently to make a strong showing that the
case is baseless, and therefore represents a failure of the tricksters'
strategy. 162
The failure may be a result of the tricksters'
overestimation of the informational asymmetry between the two
sides or underestimating the amount their opponent was willing to
spend in litigation costs.
Once the opponent has sufficient
information to make a potentially meritorious Rule 11 claim, that
opponent is highly unlikely to settle. 163
162. This is preswnably even more true in the post-1993 period, where a
stronger showing of frivolousness or baselessness must be made. See supra
Part III.
163. It is theoretically possible that an opponent might make a weak or
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Accordingly, a Rule 11 motion has a different effect on
tricksters than it does on gamblers and slackers. For the gambler,
such a motion provides information about the merits of his claim,
which may well cause him to regret having filed it. For the trickster,
however, it provides information about his opponent's state of
knowledge. While this may also lead to regret and the use of the safe
harbor provision, the trickster, unlike the slacker and gambler, is not
voluntarily withdrawing from a claim he no longer wishes to pursue.
The slacker and gambler can use the safe harbor provision to cut
their losses and move on to other cases with better prospects of
success. For the trickster, a Rule 11 motion is simply a sign that his
bluff has not worked. 164
With all these considerations in mind, we are now in a position
to answer one deep and puzzling question concerning the 1993
changes and their effects. If Rule 11 motions are down, frivolous
filings have not substantially increased, and the safe harbor provision
is being used, what does this tell us about the kinds of litigants that
are predominantly involved in Rule 11 litigation?
With the confidence of one who has a great deal of theory and a
few facts to work with, I conclude that the post-1993 experience with
Rule 11 litigation supports the view that most Rule 11 litigation
speculative Rule 11 claim, solely for the in terrorem effect it might have on the
trickster, but this would be an extremely rare occurrence. In the first place,
weak Rule 11 motions are extremely unlikely to win, particularly under the
post-1993 rule. See supra Part III. Second, Rule 11 motions filed with little or
no support would not cause the trickster to drop the claim, since they would
signal to the trickster that the informational asymmetry remained, and that the
trickster's bluff was still working. While it might be possible to use Rule 11 to
force the other side to reveal the evidentiary basis for its case, discovery
devices such as interrogatories or a summary judgment motion like that
envisioned in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), are much more
accepted and convenient vehicles to achieve the same effect.
164. One could argue that the trickster is like the gambler, only instead of
betting on the uncertain merits of a diverse portfolio of cases, like the gambler
does, the trickster bets on the uncertain risk preferences of a diverse portfolio
of defendants. Rule 11 motions then function for him as they do for the
gambler, allowing him to cut his losses on the more resistant defendants. The
important difference, however, is that the gambler's chance of success on his
remaining claims is not affected by his withdrawal from the baseless ones,
while the trickster's strategy is severely weakened if he withdraws from too
many cases.
The trickster, unlike the gambler, is always bluffing.
Accordingly, acquiring a reputation as a bluffer essentially puts an end to the
strategy.
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involves slackers and gamblers (in that order) with Don Quixotes and
tricksters comprising a relatively small part of the mix. Note that
only the slackers, in our model, respond appropriately to both major
changes in Rule 11. They make use of the safe harbor provision to
withdraw from lawsuits they have come to regret bringing. Yet, the
decreasing number and lowered likelihood of sanctions are unlikely
to encourage a major increase in negligent or mistaken filings.
Accordingly, the success of the 1993 amendments indicates that
slackers were a major if not the predominant group of litigants
involved in Rule 11 litigation.
Gamblers, however, may form a significant category of litigants
as well. Gamblers clearly benefit from and make use of the safe
harbor provisions. Indeed, as we have seen, it substantially enhances
their strategy of pursuing a portfolio of weak and uncertain claims
and then dropping the ones that turn out to be losers. The puzzling
question is why the easing of sanctions under Rule 11 has not
encouraged them to file more questionable (and therefore more
frivolous) lawsuits. A number of possibilities suggest themselves.
One is that the number of uncertain lawsuits filed by these lawyers is
not a function of the level of sanctions, but of other constraints like
lawyer time, money and opportunity costs. If so, the changes in Rule
11 may have subtly changed the kind of cases brought, but not their
total numbers. 165
165. For example, consider two potential claims that a plaintiff may bring.
The first has a potential recovery of$12,000,000, has a 10% chance of success,
and will cost $500,000 for plaintiff to litigate. Moreover, it will cost
Defendant $1,500,000 to defend and, under pre-1993 Rule 11, there was a 50%
chance those costs would be imposed as a sanction on plaintiff in the event of a
loss. Such a case had a small positive expected value to plaintiff of
((12,000,000 x .10) - ((500,000) + (.45 x 1,500,000))) = $25,000. A case with
a 20% chance of a $4,000,000 recovery, with the same litigation costs and only
a 10% chance of sanctions in the event of a loss would be worth ((4,000,000 x
.2) - ((500,000) + (.08 x 1,500,000))) = $180,000, clearly a more desirable case
to bring.
Assume that under a post-1993 Rule 11, however, the chances of a
sanction based on legal fees goes down to 10% in the first case in the event of
a loss, and to 0% in the second. The first case now has a positive expected
value of$625,000. The negative value of the sanction has been reduced to (.05
x 1,500,000 = $75,000. The second case's value has only increased to
$300,000, making the first case now the more desirable one. Of course, since
both cases now have fairly large positive expected values, one might argue that
some will be willing to pursue them both.
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Another possibility is that somewhat more cases are being
brought by the gamblers, but are being voluntarily withdrawn under
the safe harbor provision. Perhaps this is being done even without
the need for a Rule 11 motion, so they are not perceived by opposing
counsel as a substantial rise in frivolous filings. A third intriguing
possibility is that with the change in the hindsight standard of Rule
11, the low probability cases the gamblers are inclined to bring are
not only sanctioned less frequently, but are less frequently perceived
as frivolous.
The other two categories of cases, however, probably did not
figure prominently in the success of post-1993 Rule 11. The
tricksters should have increased their filings as a result of lowered
sanctions under Rule 11; 66 which would have reduced the costs of
their bluffing strategy and should therefore have led to more
frivolous filings. Unlike the gamblers and slackers, these litigants
have no incentive to voluntarily withdraw cases under the safe harbor
provisions, so an increase in their strategy would be perceived as an
increase in frivolous filings. 167 Don Quixotes, while not likely to
increase filings as a result of decreased sanctions, are also not likely
to withdraw cases under the safe harbor provisions. Accordingly, the
extensive use of the safe harbor provision and the lack of a
substantial increase in frivolous filings, supports the view that the
tricksters and Don Quixotes constitute, at most, only a small portion
of those involved in Rule 11 litigation.
V. CONCLUSION

The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 appear to represent successful
legal reform, perhaps even more successful than its drafters intended,
166. The notion that these lawyers can take on only a limited nwnber of
cases seems more dubious with respect to the tricksters than it does with
respect to the gamblers. The gamblers need to engage in serious litigation, at
least until they determine which of their cases has merit. The tricksters know
that their cases have no merit, so if the risk of pursuing their bluff decreases,
they should be willing and able to bring more such cases.
167. One might well ask, if the strategy succeeds and the cases settle, how
do opponents know they are frivolous? In some cases, events subsequent to
the settlement may reveal the truth (i.e., seriously injured plaintiff makes a
spectacular recovery).
More often, however, lawyers' suspicions and
"situation sense" may give them a pretty strong sense that something is
"fishy," even when the costs of proving that hunch are too high.
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and perhaps for reasons its drafters did not fully anticipate.
Nonetheless, it should give us all hope that even the most seemingly
intractable litigation dilemma can be substantially improved, if not
completely solved, with the right combination of study, skill, and
luck. With that said, is anybody here ready to tackle asbestos?

